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THE 2001 CONFERENCE IN HAVANA THE VHS TAPESTAPE #1 TAPE #2 TAPE #3 TAPE #4 TAPE #5 TAPE #6 TAPE #7 TAPE #8 TAPE #9 TAPE #10
BEGIN VHS -- TAPE NUMBER ONE RETURN TO TOP 0:00 Participants walk in and take seats 0:07 JUAN VELA VALDES – Cuban – Rector, University of Havana Opening statement from Cuban side. 0:13 THOMAS BLANTON – Executive Director, National Security Archives Opening statement for the American side. 0:17 JUAN VELA VALDES – Cuban – Rector, University of Havana Declares Conference officially open and asks all journalists to leave room. COMMENCEMENT OF TOPIC NUMBER ONE – U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA0:23 JAMES BLIGHT (Prof., Brown University) MODERATOR, PANEL ONE General comments concerning conference; then relays greeting to Fidel Castro from former U.S. Sec. Defense Robert McNamara, who was not able to attend. Reads short statement by McNamara concerning his view of Bay of Pigs and Operation Mongoose. 0:29 PETER KORNBLUH – National Security Archives Remarks concerning the evolution of American policy and thinking in the late 1950s and 1960s vis-à-vis Cuba. 0:37 TOMAS DIAS ACOSTA – Senior Scholar, Instituto de Historia, Havana Analysis of both Eisenhower and Kennedy Cuban policies (both economic and military) and how they evolved, especially during the transfer of power from one administration to another. 0:41 Lists various questions to be addressed, i.e. the use of the Mafia in American foreign policy. 0:43 JAMES BLIGHT (Prof., Brown University) MODERATOR, PANEL ONE 0:44 ROBERT REYNOLDS – CIA Chief of Miami office, 1960-1961 Views of the CIA as per Cuba before and during the period of his duties in Maimi. His early experience of who Castro was while Castro was still in the Sierra Maestra Mountains. In those days he (Reynolds) was in fact a “Fidelista.” Relates that he met a woman in Mexico that knew Castro and held him high regard. Assessment of Castro’s ties to Communists and the evolution of his perception of the Castro Communist ties. 0:48 JAMES BLIGHT (Prof., Brown University) MODERATOR, PANEL ONE 0:49 WAYNE SMITH – Political Officer, U.S. Embassy, Havana, 1958-1961 Gives general train of events that lead to break in relations between US and Cuba. He was aide to Ambassador Bonsal. The Ambassador’s attitude to Castro and Revolution and the Castro government evolved in personnel. Bonsal’s conflict with Washington in overall policy direction. 0:53 Arrival of Soviet Union’s Anastas Mykoyan and the Embassy’s perception of his influence in Cuba. 0:55 The explosion of the French ship Le Cubre in Havana Harbor. Was that CIA sabotage? Affect on deterioration of Cuba/US relations? 0:57 Imminent break in relations and preparation for that event. 0:59 JAMES BLIGHT (Prof., Brown University) MODERATOR, PANEL ONE Asks for questions or comments re: events thus far… 1:00 CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO Question as to identity of the woman in Mexico that said she knew him. 1:06 ROBERT REYNOLDS – CIA Chief of Miami office, 1960-1961 Answers Castro. 1:07 CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO 1:11 JAMES BLIGHT (Prof., Brown University) MODERATOR, PANEL ONE 1:12 JAMES G. HERSHBERG, Professor, George Washington University Asks question of both sides about the Le Cubre incident in Havana Harbor. 1:14 CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO Responds to hershberg. Relates his actual experience of the Le Cubre incident and the funeral of the casualties. Arms trading with other countries. Early childhood memories of weaponry. 1:29 Re: tests he and VP Fernandez about the nature of the explosion on ship to discern who might have been responsible. Was it terrorism? 1:36 ROBERT REYNOLDS – CIA Chief of Miami office, 1960-1961 Responds to Castro as to his view if role of CIA in Le Cubre incident. 1:37 CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO Responds to Reynolds. 1:40 JUAN CARLOS RODRIGUEZ, Cuban – Historian of Playa Giron (Bay of Pigs) Responds to Reynolds, asserting presence of Americans seen near ship while loading in Belgium and again seen in Havana. 1:4? ROBERT REYNOLDS – CIA Chief of Miami office, 1960-1961 Responds to Rodriguez. Concedes suspicion, but believes he was in position to know. 1:43 EFIGENIO ANEIGIRAS – Cuban – Head of Police Relates his experience of the Le Cubre explosion and his encounter with Fidel Castro that day and of Ernesto Che Guevara. Speaks to facts of second of two explosions and whether the incident was planned and why. 1:47 MAX AZICRI – Cuban-American – Professor, Edinboro State University Questions timing of explosion vis-à-vis arrival of both Castro and Che. An assassination attempt? 1:48 CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO Responds to assertion of assassination. Was explosion assassination of to prevent arms to arrive to Cuba? 1:50 Speaks of kinds of weapons needed in Cuba at the time. Discusses other attempts on his life at the time and other elements of the incident that led Cuba to believe that the explosion was not an accident. Asserts that the purpose of this conference is not to lay blame but to discover the truth. 1:59 END TAPE ONE
BEGIN VHS -- TAPE NUMBER TWO RETURN TO TOP 0:00 – 0:04 (Overlap of previous tape) 0:04 CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO Concludes remarks begun on previous tape. 0:05 JAMES BLIGHT (Prof., Brown University) MODERATOR, PANEL ONE Relates new conference ground rules… 0:04 CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO Brief response to J. BLIGHT. 0:06 GEN. SAMUEL RODILES – Cuban – Police Battalion Chief at Bay of Pigs Recalls day of La Cubre explosion and trying to keep Castro away from the explosion. Explores whether the incident was aimed at Castro. 0:09 CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO Responds to GEN. RODILES. GEN. SAMUEL RODILES – Cuban – Police Battalion Chief at Bay of Pigs Responds to CASTRO. Insists on possibility of assassination attempt. 0:09 CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO Responds to GEN. RODILES. 0:11 Conference adjourns for break. 0:13 Return from BREAK. 0:13 JAMES BLIGHT (Prof., Brown University) MODERATOR, PANEL ONE States that Sam Halpern (ex-CIA Chief) has offered to look at documents related to La Cubre to see if he can determine where documents came from and there veracity. BLIGHT then directs Conference attention to the US angle and that of the Kennedy Administration. 0:15 TOMAS DIAS ACOSTA – Senior Scholar, Instituto de Historia, Havana Asks SCHLESINGER why he was involved in the Bay of Pigs planning. 0:16 AUTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR. – Special Asst. to President Kennedy Responds to ACOSTA as to his view of Kennedy’s thoughts on the whole Cuban adventure. 0:18 Talks about the so-called “disposal problem” as it was called by Allen Dulles. 0:19 Refers to destabilization of President Betancourt in Venezuela. Eisenhower vs Kennedy as war planners. Kennedy and the “disposal problem.” 0:21 The question of military intervention. 0:23 Kennedy’s lessons from the Bay of Pigs and its relation to the coming Missile Crisis. 0:24 RICHARD N. GOODWIN – Special Asst. to President Kennedy Elucidates the atmosphere of the period and fear of the Soviet Union. Talks of the 1960 election and the concerns of Americans at the time. 0:27 Gives his own opinion of the Cuban situation at the time. Re: Soviet Union. What if the invasion worked? 0:?? AUTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR. – Special Asst. to President Kennedy Adds to GOODWIN. The CIA angle. The lack of understanding of the new administration. McNamara’s involvement. 0:33 RICHARD N. GOODWIN – Special Asst. to President Kennedy The nationalizations issue. The idea of socialism. States his delights as to the success of the Revolution. 0:34 JAMES BLIGHT (Prof., Brown University) MODERATOR, PANEL ONE Asks the Cuban side if there is any response thus far as to the Kennedy aids assertions. 0:36 CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO Responds to the general thrust of the Kennedy side. The Cold War… “Everything is blamed on the Cold War” … And the idea of blame and its relationship to the memory of men. 0:40 Relations of US and Cuba. The Kennedy generation. The Spanish Am. War. The Platt Amendment. Other US interventions in the world, in Latin America. Sandino in Nicauragua. The Panama Canal. Arbenz in Guatamala. 0:45 Opinion of Kennedy. Kennedy and Cuba. 0:47 Nixon vs. Kennedy. Castro’s experience of Nixon. The Soviets and the Chinese. Reads CIA report of him and Cuba. 0:54 Cuba and international law and the right of the Revolution to do in Cuba what it had to do. Continues reading from the CIA report. Would he have preferred Nixon or Kennedy..? Types of weaponry in Cuba before the Bay of Pigs. 1:00 Italian weapons. Cuba sending weapons to Algeria. Czechoslovakian weapons in Cuba. 1:03 The American B-26 planes over Cuba before Bay of Pigs. 1:04 Results of Invasion. If it was successful, there would have been a Vietnam in Cuba before Vietnam. The concept of a provisional government right after invasion. The role of the OAS in recognizing the provisional government. But the people would have fought nonetheless. 1:07 Was it about Socialism, Communism..? The common Cuban citizen’s relationship to the Revolution as oppose to Cubans and the Battista regime. 1:11 The possible reaction of the Soviets to a successful invasion. And if Nixon instead of Kennedy were in power … there would have been a different outcome. 1:14 Kennedy admits responsibility. Kennedy and Missile Crisis. Castro’s impression of Kennedy. 1:20 JAMES G. HERSHBERG, Professor, George Washington University Recalls certain Brazilian documents concerning Soviet reaction to Invasion and to there possible challenge to US in other parts of world as consequence. Asks if Castro might be able to release documents between him and Soviets at the time to really understand the events of the day. 1:22 CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO Responds to HERSHBERG. Introduces an historian on Cuban side who has documented the Revolution. But then talks of his own experience of early years of struggle after landing of Granma. Talks of Che and Raul and their keeping dairies in the mountains. 1:27 Possible Cuban documents relating to Soviet Union. 1:28 Going to United Nations and getting kicked out of a New York hotel and going to Harlem hotel. 1:31 Re: Meeting Khrushchev and his respect for him and difficulties of friendship.
Soviet weapons and talking with Khrushchev about Soviet weapons in Harlem.
1:39 Re: as to whether the Revolution would have been successful if they were professional economists or professional soldiers. 1:41 What to do after the fall of Soviet Union..? Continue ? Or Shoot themselves..? 1:43 Predicted the fall of Soviets two years before it happened and said they will continue. 1:47 Discusses with VP FERNANDEZ about schedule… 1:48 JAMES BLIGHT (Prof., Brown University) MODERATOR, PANEL ONE Says they will start TOPIC TWO after lunch. 1:49 BREAK FOR LUNCH 1:49 END TAPE TWO
BEGIN VHS -- TAPE NUMBER THREE RETURN TO TOP0:00 Participants walk in and take seats COMMENCEMENT OF TOPIC NUMBER TWO – CUBA’S RESPONSE TOU.S. POLICY0:01 JUAN CARLOS RODRIGUEZ, Cuban – Historian of Playa Giron States TOPIC TWO title as that of how the Revolution went about defending itself in preparation for the possible invasion. 0:03 JOSE LUIS MENDEZ – Cuban – Center for Hist. Investigation on Natioanl Security Sets tone for the topic, re: what Cuba was facing before the invasion, internally and internationally. (Video problems here from minute 09 to minute 18. Sound is okay, however.) 0:09 JORGE DOMINGUEZ – Prof. of International Affairs – Harvard University Speaks to rational of US setting up the Brigade 2506 to invade Cuba vis-à-vis Cuba’s activity in Latin America especially in Venezuela. Then sets up various questions to explore. --The role of Cuban intelligence regarding the Brigade 2506. – The planning of invasion in Kennedy Administration. –The Cuban militias. – The internal resistance in Cuba. –The capture of the various resistance and their imprisonment. Nixon’s reaction to Castro when he met him. 0:21 JUAN CARLOS RODRIGUEZ, Cuban – Historian of Playa Giron How Cuba readied itself for invasion. The general population. The Militia. 0:24 PEDRO MIRET – Cuban – Social Historian Catalogues the various social successes in the first two years of the Revolution leading up to the Bay of Pigs so as to give sense of commitment of the general population to the regime. 0:29 JUAN CARLOS RODRIGUEZ, Cuban – Historian of Playa Giron As to training of the Cuban Militia. But before giving floor to VP JOSE RAMON FERNANDEZ, speaker relates a document readied for President Kennedy that stated the Cuban Militia will defect at the start of an invasion. 0:31 CUBAN VP, JOSE RAMON FERNANDEZ Speaks to the training if the Cuban Militia and the purchase of their weapons before the Bay of Pigs. Underlines the voluntary nature of the Militia. Tells of Castro’s visit to the training camps. That while their were difficulties in the training in the Militia, they were committed and were prepared when the time came. Defectors, deserters..? The army was the people. Counters the intelligence of US in this regard. 0:40 CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO Exchanges a few remarks with VP FERNANDEZ. 0:41 WAYNE SMITH – Political Officer, U.S. Embassy, Havana, 1958-1961 Talks to lack of real assessment by CIA as to the possibility of uprising and whether there would be popular support of Cubans for regime. 0:45 PHILIP BRENNER – Prof. of International Politics – American University The lessons of Guatemala in the planning for the Bayof Pigs. Che in Guatemala. What extent was Guatemala the basis for a plan..? 0:47 ROBERT REYNOLDS – CIA Chief of Miami office, 1960-1961 Responds to BRENNER. Passes over Guatemala but speaks to the hubris of parts of the CIA. 0:49 PIERO GLEIJESES – Prof. of US Foreign Policy – Johns Hopkins University Speaks more directly to the Guatemalan model. 0:51 Kennedy and his 1960 campaign vs. Nixon and the Cuban issue at that time. The issue of where to land; to land here and not there and why. 0:53 CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO Detailed analysis of the US strategy, the various landing options it entertained, the Cuban response to what they understood the landing options to be, and the preparedness of the Army and the Militia. 1:29 ALFREDO DURAN – Cuban-American – 2506 Brigade Veteran Responds to CASTRO and speaks to the various landing options and the general invasion plan. The plan for the Provisional Government and that actual battle. 1:34 JUAN CARLOS RODRIGUEZ, Cuban – Historian of Playa Giron Suggests that they discuss the battle proper in the next TOPIC. 1:35 CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO 1:36 WAYNE SMITH – Political Officer, U.S. Embassy, Havana, 1958-1961 Speaks to what Kennedy was told as per the landing options and the nearness of whatever mountains as refuge. The question of American military intervention. 1:39 CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO Responds to and follows up on SMITH. Elucidates the advantages of the three possible landing sites (as they saw it) and why. 1:45 RICHARD N. GOODWIN – Special Asst. to President Kennedy Responds to CASTRO vis-à-vis his own experience in the invasion planning, the landing sites and his observations of the CIA. Addresses the idea of the Provisional Government and a beach-head. Fallout of possible American Military invasion as opposed to the Cuban-American Brigade. 1:49 AUTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR. – Special Asst. to President Kennedy Agrees with and follows-up on GOODWIN. 1:50 CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO Responds to GOODWIN and SCHLESINGER. And wants to know what Kennedy had in mind if Beach Head was established. 1:53 AUTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR. – Special Asst. to President Kennedy Responds to CASTRO. 1:54 RICHARD N. GOODWIN – Special Asst. to President Kennedy Responds to CASTRO. 1:55 PETER KORNBLUH – National Security Archives Relates what Richard Bissell told Kennedy about the landing sites. 1:56 Re: declassified Church Committee Report on the Bay of Pigs as concerns what Bissell and Kennedy talked about.. 1:58 CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO Asks where this info came from. 1:59 MAX AZICRI – Cuban-American – Professor, Edinboro State University Begins detailing his involvement with the CIA and in the planning of Bay of Pigs invasion. Traveling in Chile and Uruguay. 1:59 END TAPE THREE
BEGIN VHS -- TAPE NUMBER FOUR RETURN TO TOP0:00 – 0:03 (Overlap of previous tape) 0:03 MAX AZICRI – Cuban-American – Professor, Edinboro State University Continues detailing his involvement with the CIA and in the planning of invasion. Re: the Provisional Government sequestered in Opalocka, Florida. 0:06 Organizing anti-Castro demonstrations in Latin America in coordination with the Provisional Government. 0:08 Asks himself if he now feels proud of all of this..? 0:09 ROBERTO CARBALLO – Cuban-American – 2506 Brigade Veteran Speaks of his meeting in 1970s with Miro Cardona and how his statements are in conflict with what Schlesinger now says. 0:10 Re: the origins and realty behind the idea of possible American military invasion in response to the initial Brigade invasion. 0:11 SAMUEL HALPERN – CIA Executive Assistant for Operation Mongoose Introduces his involvement with both the Bay of Pigs and Operation Mongoose and says that we must hold off indicting the CIA till the next day’s TOPIC begins and more will be learned about the Kennedy responsibilities for both of these operations. 0:13 SAUL LANDAU – Professor, California State Polytechnic University Challenges SCHLESINGER as to his credentials as an historian and his real involvement with the Bay of Pigs invasion and the Kennedy administration. American imperialism. 0:14 Was there anyone in Kennedy Administration to provide a real worse case scenario for the invasion. 0:15 AUTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR. – Special Asst. to President Kennedy Responds to LANDAU. 0:15 RICHARD N. GOODWIN – Special Asst. to President Kennedy Responds to LANDAU and seconds SCHLESINGER. Goes on to address the notion of American imperialism if there was an economic motive to the Kennedy Cuba policy. The Cold War and Soviet Union. US policy toward Trujillo and the Dominican Republic. 0:17 Lessons of the Bay of Pigs. 0:18 LUIS TORNES – Cuban-American – 2506 Brigade Veteran His involvement in Bay of Pigs and the pretext for an American military invasion. 0:20 ALFREDO DURAN – Cuban-American – 2506 Brigade Veteran Responds to TORNES. What was the real goal of the invasion on the part of the US? Talks of the nature of the actual landing and the possibility of military invasion. Richard Bissell. Idea of beach head. 0:23 JAMES G. HERSHBERG – Professor, George Washington University Asks question of CASTRO. The Cuban press and the split in the 1960s between the Soviet Union and China. 0:23 CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO Responds to HERSHBERG vis-à-vis China and Mao and other influences on his ideas and revolutionary strategies. 0:25 Influence of Hemingway’s “For Whom the Bells Toll.” 0:27 World War II. 0:28 The role of Che Guevara; problems of the Third World and Cuba’s involvement therein. 0:30 Problems during the first days of Revolution. --Visits to Argentina. -- Precursors to the US’s Alliance for Progress. --Beginning of diplomatic relations with China and the Soviets and the requests for weapons.
--The need for weapons. 0:35 TERENCE HOPMANN – Professor of Political Science, Brown University The real relationship between Cuba and Soviet Union and how that changed in later 1960, but how there is little evidence of how that changed. What evidence in CIA led to change of this view? 0:38 CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO Makes comments about conference schedule. 0:40 Conference adjourns for break 0:42 Return from BREAK 0:42 JUAN CARLOS RODRIGUEZ, Cuban – Historian of Playa Giron Gives the floor to RICARDO ALARCON. But first… 0:42 CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO Makes additional comments about conference schedule. 0:38 RICARDO ALARCON – Cuban – Head of Consejo de Estado Addresses the fundamental issue of US/Cuban relations since the beginning. Produces a book written in the 60s by the US State Department that talks of methods to impede the revolutionary movement in Cuba. Reads from and discusses aspects of this book. 0:48 The Kirkpatrick Report (National Security Archives) and the US embassy in Cuba in the late 50s and early 60s 0:50 Reads from another document as to CIA involvement in resistant movement in Cuba. 0:52 The natural resistance in Cuba from various segments of Cuban society after the triumph of the revolution. 0:53 The subsequent manipulation of this natural resistance by the CIA. 0:54 His traveling to Venezuela. 0:55 Covert US action contra Cuba dates to before victory of the Revolution. 0:57 RAMIRO VALDEZ MENENDES – Cuban – Ministry of Interior Review of the state of the Cuban resistance after the triumph of the Revolution and before the Bay of Pigs. 1:05 Beginning of arrests. 1:06 Establishment of the CDRs (Committees for the Defense of the Revolution) and the arrests of the supposed spies right after the first bombings before the Giron attack. No counter-revolutionary arrestees were killed during this 24-hour period. Release of Counter-revs, even CIA informers… 1:09 G2 (Cuban Intelligence) had no relations with counter-revs abroad 1:10 ROBERT REYNOLDS – CIA Chief of Miami office, 1960-1961 Re: the effectiveness of the Cuban security forces, even as being a young security force. 1:11 WAYNE SMITH – Political Officer, U.S. Embassy, Havana, 1958-1961 Takes issue with Goodwin on Cold War point. He says the economic and nationalizations did have a big role in the attach. --The King Ranch. Cannot say there was not an economic factor, especially during the Ike period. When JFK came in, that was all over. 1:14 CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO Possible uprisings verses the inexperience of the security forces. Review of decades before triumph of the Revolution: the military coupe that occurred in the in 30s, Machado, and the appointment of descendent of Cespedes appointed President. Emergence of Battista out of this period. --Question of if US would intervene. FDR and the Good Neighbor Policy. FDR was careful. --The Platt Amendment. Meeting of an officer of the Battista regime with Fidel re: to stop the fighting. They reach agreement re: the Santiago Garrison. --But this man wanted to go to Havana, but FC says him he should not go to Havana. FC told him 3 conditions of his going to Havana. --No coupe in Capitol --Not to let Battista escape --Not to contact US Embassy in Havana. Then this man then went to Havana and did just opposite. 1:33 The taking of the various Battista Garrisons around country. So Coup in Havana had meant nothing. Tending to Prisoners before tending to their own. Re: VP RAMON Fernandez being in prison. The Dissolution of Battista regime as the Revolution triumphed. Battista flees to Santo Domingo Asks Pilot Carrerras about number of Pilots of Air Force at time of BOP… His march to Havana as he passed through the various towns and cities. The support of workers and students. Founding the CDRs after a bomb that went off in 1960 while he was meeting with Khrushchev. The military courts established after victory of the Revolution. --Better than Nuremberg. Not inspired by spirit of vengeance but of justice. Broadcast of radio station to urge people to justice and not vengeance. 1:45 Asks Carrerras about the fight against the US ship the Houston. 1:47 Discussion with Menendez about when and how many prisoners were released. 1:50 JORGE DOMINGUEZ – Prof. of International Affairs – Harvard University Responds to CASTRO. 1:5? CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO Responds to DOMINGUES Re: troop movements. Division of the Escambray. And putting weapons in houses. He and his body guards capture a prisoner. Positioning troops in Escambray. Re: Literacy campaign going on during on at time of Bay of Pigs. Decision to let the students to stay in country for their protection. Re: Possible landing at Trinidad, as vs. Giron. --The defense of Trinidad by the ordinary people even though invasion took place at Giron. Tactics of various Guerilla wars… --Angola, Guatemala. --There was a difference of Bay of Pigs to what happened later in Afghanistan. 2:00 END TAPE FOUR
BEGIN VHS -- TAPE NUMBER FIVE RETURN TO TOP0:00-0:04 (overlap from previous tape) 0:04 CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO (Continues) He trades remakes with Cuban SAMUEL RODRIGUES about dates of captures of prisoners. The pros and cons of the various landing sites from point view of the attackers. Trinidad landing gave possibility to make off to mountains. But what about Giron? Allusion to tactics within Arab/Israeli conflict. 0:09 Allusion to a possible Vietnam-type guerilla war in Cuba. Discussion as to breaking for lunch. 0:10 BREAK FOR LUNCH Mingling of participants. CASTRO TALKING WITH AIDES. 0:13 Conference re-convenes 0:13 CUBAN VP, JOSE RAMON FERNANDEZ Greets guests. COMMENCEMENT OF TOPIC NUMBER THREE – THE FIRST ATTACKS AND THE FINAL BATTLE AT THE BAY OF PIGS 0:14 ANGEL JIMENEZ – Cuban Commander at the Bay of Pigs, MODERATOR Introduces and gives background of GENERAL RODILES. 0:15 GEN. SAMUEL RODILES – Cuban – Police Battalion Chief at Bay of Pigs RE: assesses books and other info about Giron published outside Cuba vs. the same from Cuba. Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations relative responsibilities for attack. Share his personal experience of battle and why they won. Operation Pluto. Castro was able to understand the intentions of CIA, i.e. the role of provisional government and possible later attack by US ground troops. 0:23 JAMES BLIGHT – Professor, Brown University He is not a soldier. The role of memory in battle. What were the key moments? What if there was a second air strike? Did Cuban Military have plan for full US invasion of CUBA? What was Castro’s role in battle of Giron. 0:28 CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO Brief comment. 0:28 JUAN CARLOS RODRIGUEZ – Cuban – Historian of Playa Giron Re: his study of the battle. Gives summery of FC’s role in counter invasion activities. 0:32 Magazine BOHEMIA – a poll of the Cuban peoples' attitude to the Revolutionary government. Lists guns batteries in use before battle began. 0:35 Planes on guard waiting for second wave of air attack. The markings of attack planes being like the Cuban planes. Men at Isle of Youth did not think planes were attacking. Relates what Pilot Carrerras thought. The possible second air attack. 0:39 CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO Responds to RODRIGUES re: the second air strike. Mobilization of planes before air strike. --Anti-aircraft guns. --Was not sure of what role of the Brigade 2506 in Nicaragua. Cuba had only nine pilots on hand. Depended on Anti-aircraft. Worried more about multiple landings than a single concentrated landing. Distribution of the various military leaders throughout country. Asks how many Cuban men were with arms? Talks with VP FERNANDEZ as to various arms they may have bought from various countries. 0:45 Discussion about number of large weapons and where they were placed. 0:47 Asks another Cuban… Asks VP FERNANDEZ. --At least 300,000 men under arms. More numbers about guns and other arms. Talks of platoon at Playas Larga and Giron on the Bay of Pigs. 0:53 ANOTHER CUBAN GENERAL (UN-NAMED) He stands; he was at Trinidad and talks about forces that were placed at Trinidad for possible landing there. --Also various gun placements there. --Also American rocket launchers. 0:57 CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO Responds then reviews overall strategy. 0:59 They did not really know what the invasion forces were going to do. Also, intelligence info was more or less scarce.
--Adopted a wait an see.
Then came the surprise air strike.
Assess the way the attack planes did there job. Was at command post on 15th when first attack came. 1:03 Explosion of one of the Cuban planes. 1:04 CUBAN SOLDIER (UN-NAMED) Stands to explain the evening of the 15th. 1:06 Planes came from Nicaragua. B-26s. Attacks with planes with Cuban markings. All the time using Cuban Markings. 1:07 CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO Summarizes Cuban thoughts before actual invasion. He saw planes coming in and relates the anti-aircraft response manned by 16 and 17 year-olds. After this, he knew for sure a land attack was imminent. 1:12 The funeral of victims of air attacks and his speech about announcing the Socialist character of the Revolution.
The political response to the attack. Remembers singing the slogan “Homeland or Death.” Gets report that there was a landing at Playa Larga at the Bay of Pigs. 2:00 END TAPE FIVE
BEGIN VHS -- TAPE NUMBER SIX RETURN TO TOP0:00 – 0:04 (Overlap of previous tape) 0:04 CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO (Continued) The Australia Sugar Mill near the Bay of Pigs. Assesses the viability of the Bay of Pigs as a landing site. Asks CUBAN SOLDIER to stand and explain is actions at Bay of Pigs. 0:06 CUBAN SOLDIER AND CASTRO EXCHANGE COMMENTS Concerning the sinking of the US ships the RIO ESCONDIDO and the HOUSTON. 0:08 CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO CUBAN VP, JOSE RAMON FERNANDEZ Explains aspects of the landing at the Bay of Pigs. CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO Gives detailed account – along with interjections of various of his cohorts on the Cuban side, including VP FERNANDEZ – of the actual landing (and problems of the landing forces) and how his own troops responded. Vigorous exchanges with men from his side as to what in fact actually happened during landing. 0:29 Gets up to join MODERATOR JIMENEZ at a large map of the Bay of Pigs. 0:30 ANGEL JIMENEZ – Cuban Commander at the Bay of Pigs, MODERATOR With a pointer, explains the map. 0:31 CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO AT THE MAP CASTRO takes the microphone then shares it with various of his commanders and Cuban historians as they recall the battle in a blow-by-blow manner. 1:03 THOMAS BLANTON – Executive Director, National Security Archives He interrupts CASTRO to say that it may be a good idea for one of BRIGADE VETERANS, ALFREDO DURAN, to join him at the map and share his memories of the Bay of Pigs battle. 1:04 ALFREDO DURAN – Cuban-American – 2506 Brigade Veteran Joins CASTRO and VP FERNANDEZ at map and explains his side of the story. He then sits at a microphone and explains the problem created by the sinking of the two U.S. supply ships, the RIO ESCONDIDO and the HOUSTON. He and CASTRO continue to exchange memories of the battle. 1:06 CUBAN SOLDIER interjects from audience that he was one shooting at DURAN that day. 1:07 CASTRO then asks the CUBAN SOLDIER to join ALFREDO DURAN at the map. 1:15 MARIO CABELLO – Cuban-American – 2506 Brigade Veteran Explains his part in the battle especially being on the U.S. ship HOUSTON when it was sunk. 1:17 Speaks to the concept of the “Disposability” of the Brigade members as viewed by the Kennedy Administration. And the fact that much of the equipment on the ship did not work. 1:19 CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO AT THE MAP Interjects to ask CABELLO a question about the HOUSTON. Then he and CABELLO exchange thoughts about what actually happened during the attack. 1:21 CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO AT THE MAP Continues to exchange comments various others of his men (about a half dozen) who were there on the beach that day. 1:59 END TAPE SIX
BEGIN VHS -- TAPE NUMBER SEVEN RETURN TO TOP0:00 – 0:04 (Overlap of previous tape) 0:04 CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO AT THE MAP (Continued) Continues to exchange comments with various others of his men who were on the beach that day. 0:32 THOMAS BLANTON – Executive Director, National Security Archives Asks at what point did AFREDO DURAN give up and retreat into the swamp. 0:33 ALFREDO DURAN – Cuban-American – 2506 Brigade Veteran Explains his position once he realized that they would not be evacuated. 0:35 Relates the day he was captured. 0:37 CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO AT THE MAP Recalls incident of near the end of the battle he and his men found a building full of American Bazookas. Continues to relate events of the end of the battle. 0:41 Relates almost getting shot that day. ALFREDO DURAN says it might have been him. 0:49 The story of a man CASTRO discovered in a hut. He was injured was sent to the hospital but who then, when he was free to do so, asked for asylum at an embassy. 0:51 LUIS TORNES says that the Brigade members know who this man is. 0:55 Says that is may be time to break for lunch. 0:56 END OF PRESENTATION AT THE MAP 0:56 BREAK FOR LUNCH MINGLING OF PARTICIPANTS CASTRO CHATTING WITH PARTICIPANTS 0:57 Conference re-convenes 0:58 CUBAN VP, JOSE RAMON FERNANDEZ Greets guests. COMMENCEMENT OF TOPIC NUMBER FOUR – THE AFTERMATH OF THE BAY OF PIGS – IMPACT, LEGACY, LESSONS 0:59 PHILIP BRENNER – American University – MODERATOR Remarks about all those responsible for the success of the conference. Thanks CASTRO for his participation and the de-classification of Cuban documents that make the understanding of the Bay of Pigs. Establishes the tone of the TOPIC and the legacy of the Bay of Pigs. Asks participants to concentrate on the years immediately after the Bay of Pigs. The idea of U.S. obsession with Cuba. Introduces JULIA SWEIG and ROSA LOPEZ. 1:04 JULIA SWEIG – Council of Foreign Relations Cuba Specialist The possible metaphors for Giron and the Bay of Pigs – and questions. 1:05 The question of Che Guevara and his talks with GOODWIN and why did not the U.S. pursue this? What did U.S. expect to get out of Operation Mongoose? The Donovan negotiations for prisoner release? Did the Missile Crisis have affect on the prisoner negotiations.
What happened after the Kennedy assassination?
Why has nothing seem to have changed in US/Cuba relations since the Bay of Pigs? 1:10 ROSA LOPEZ – Cuban – University of Havana Center on United States Studies Notes on why has nothing has changed since the Bay of Pigs… 1:15 PHILIP BRENNER – American University – MODERATOR Calls on GOODWIN and SCHLESINGER on impact of failure on the Kennedy White House. 1:16 AUTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR. – Special Asst. to President Kennedy Clarifies the “Disposal Problem” issue. Reads from notes he made to himself on April 21, 1961 concerning the immediate aftermath inside the White House… 1:25 Addresses the notion of a Kennedy obsession with Castro and Cuba. 1:27 RICHARD N. GOODWIN – Special Asst. to President Kennedy His memory of the immediately aftermath. 1:30 Relates his lengthy meeting in Uruguay with Che Guevara… 1:35 His subsequent meeting with Kennedy. 1:36 Why there was not immediate talk about a new policy toward Cuba and the effect of the Missile Crisis had on Kennedy. New ideas after this and new meetings, but then the Kennedy assassination. The embargo and internal U.S. politics. 1:39 SAMUEL HALPERN – CIA Executive Assistant for Operation Mongoose Addresses the Kennedy obsession with Cuba. 1:41 Long detailed explanation of the “Cuba Project” (terror activity against Cuba) and the beginnings of Operation Mongoose and the plans to assassinate President Castro.
1:59 END TAPE SIX
BEGIN VHS -- TAPE NUMBER EIGHT RETURN TO TOP0:00 – 0:04 (Overlap of previous tape) 0:04 JORGE HERNANDEZ – University of Havana Center on U.S. Studies The Cuba Obsession in the United States. Observes that HALPERN and GOODWIN differ on their understanding of the extent of U.S. operations against Cuba. Offers floor to another Cuban scholar to address U.S. sabotage contra Cuba. 0:06 XAVIER ESCALANTE – Cuban – Scholar First briefly addresses Operation Mongoose and gives numbers on operations. 0:07 Other autonomous operations against Cuba unrelated to Operation Mongoose and gives statistics here also. Mafia connections. Howard Hunt. William Harvey. Various Cuban exile groups and actions against Cuba. Assassination of Che in Bolivia. Allende in Chile. 0:10 ISRAEL BEJAR – Cuban – Chief of Security Addresses the Kennedy Obsession, Operation Mongoose and various other CIA operations. Discusses what they have learned through the 1975 Church Committee and the extent and origin of various and mysterious events they already knew to have taken place in Cuba. 0:19 JOSE BUAJASAN – Cuban – Former Head of Cuban Counterintelligence Agrees with ESCALANTE and BEJAR and further underlines how the autonomous operations also badly effect the American people and other people everywhere in the world. 0:22 PHILIP BRENNER – American University – MODERATOR Invites SMITH to speak to what has been said and asks that not to forget also the possibilities of rapport between the two countries. 0:23 WAYNE SMITH – Political Officer, U.S. Embassy, Havana, 1958-1961 Observes that there were two tracks moving along – Operation Mongoose and what he knows of Kennedy’s desire to improve relations. The Missile Crisis. The Kennedy assassination and its connection with Kennedy’s wanting to discuss openings to Cuba..? 0:29 JORGE DOMINGUEZ – Professor of International Affairs – Harvard University Responds to SMITH and ESCALANTE. The autonomous terrorists. And natural opposition to Castro in Cuba. Effect of agrarian reform of the revolution and the events of 1961 and the CIA. 0:33 JOHN NOLAN – Worked for release of Brigade 2506 in 1962 Talks of the prisoner exchange. James Donovan vs. Castro. Porcupines making love… Asks to hear CASTRO’s view of the negotiations and the problems of the money. The CIA employees also in Cuban prisons. Did CASTRO know this..? Jean Daniel of France. Was with Castro when he learned of Kennedy assassination… Comments. 0:42 PHILIP BRENNER – American University – MODERATOR Asks to keep going without break. Asks for Comments. 0:43 UN-NAMED CUBAN SCHOLAR More information concerning the back-channel Kennedy attempts to begin a dialogue with Cuba. 0:45 PETER KORNBLUH – National Security Archives More about the back-channel from the Kennedy and into the Johnson administrations. Reads from CIA’s George Helms memo to McGeorge Bundy concerning this back-channel in the Johnson years. Asks of CASTRO if the memo was based in fact. 0:48 CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO Lengthy response to KORNBLUH vis-à-vis a possible dialog with the U.S. and later, concerning the protracted negotiations with the lawyer Donovan for the release of the Bay of Pigs prisoners. 1:32 Concerning sabotage against Cuba conducted after the Bay of Pigs, especially from 1961 until 1965, and the various prisoners held by Cuba after the release of the Bay of Pigs prisoners.
1:43 Poses the question of why Operation Mongoose seems always to be dealt with separately from the Missile Crisis.
1:44 END TAPE EIGHT
BEGIN VHS -- TAPE NUMBER NINE RETURN TO TOP0:00 – 0:04 (Overlap of previous tape) 0:04 CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO (continued) Operation Mongoose… 0:08 Reads from document from the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning possible ways to create a pretext for a direct military invasion of Cuba.
0:10 Relates the explosion of the USS Maine and the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution as pretexts for military aggression on the part of the US. 0:13 The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1965, Cuban family unification and emigration. 0:15 Negotiations with the Cuban expert on ice cream who wanted to leave for the US. 0:19 Again the connection between the Missile Crisis and Operation Mongoose. 0:20 Comments on the placement of the Soviet missiles in Cuba. 0:21 Maximo Gomez and Jose Marti. 0:24 Cuban involvement in Venezuela during the Romolo Bettencourt. 0:26 Re: the Che Guevara memorial in Santa Clara. 0:28 Apologizes for talking so much. 0:28 Re: Otto Reich, advisor to George Bush. 0:29 Re: The Cuban American National Foundation and its involvement on his life. 0:33 President Bush’s relationship with various groups wishing to kill him (Castro). Various problems in Latin America. 0:40 The current strength of the Revolution. Relative state of Cuban education today. 0:44 The future of the Revolution in the 21st Century. 0:46 AIDS in Africa and other world problems. 0:49 The future of US/Cuba relations. Travel restrictions from US to Cuba. 0:52 PHILIP BRENNER – American University – MODERATOR Asks for the panel to comment on the lessons of the Bay of Pigs. 0:53 ALFREDO DURAN – Cuban-American – 2506 Brigade Veteran Hopes of seeds of reconciliation. 0:54 AUTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR. – Special Asst. to President Kennedy Thanks the organizers of the Conference. Then states that after all, there has been no outright US military invasion of Cuba, and John Kennedy’s hand in this “restraint.” 0:57 Hopes for better relationship between US and Cuba. 0:57 PHILIP BRENNER – American University – MODERATOR Asks CASTRO if he thinks the Conference was a success. 0:58 CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO Responds to BRENNER and relates to negotiations ongoing about various problems. 1:00 Returns to the Missile Crisis and what the Soviets knew and didn’t always tell Cuba. 1:02 Missiles in Turkey and Italy at the same time (aimed at USSR). 1:05 What if Cuba said no to the Missiles..? 1:06 Operation Mongoose. 1:07 US spying on Khrushchev while he was in New York. 1:08 JORGE HERNANDEZ – University of Havana Center on U.S. Studies Thanks all the participants of the conference. 1:09 CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO VP FERNANDEZ asks everyone if they would like to have copies of the conference that the government has been shooting. 1:12 Offers all the Cuban declassified materials to everyone who wants them. 1:12 Discusses with VF FERNANDEZ about the events the next day when the conference adjourns to Playa Giron. 1:17 CASTRO invites everyone (all 180 people) for a special ending dinner with him that evening. 1:21 Asks panel about the menu. Typical Cuban menu … but no beef. 1:24 END TAPE NINE
BEGIN VHS -- TAPE NUMBER TEN RETURN TO TOPThis final tape has no sound in the first few minutes and does not have English translation until the PRESS CONFERENCES at Playa Larga and Playa Giron. This English translation is sequential and not simultaneous, as it had been during the previous first two days of the conference. This tape also does not have a burned in time counter. Set VHS deck footage to ZERO upon inserting tape. The time markers below were determined accordingly. PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO did not attend events of this last day. As such, Cuban Vice-President JOSE RAMON FERNANDEZ hosted most of the proceedings. THE BUS JOURNEY TO THE BAY OF PIGS 0:00 ARRIVAL AT AUSTRALIA SUGAR MILL This was the military headquarters of FIDAL CASTRO during the 3-day Bay of Pigs Invasion. Now a museum. 0:08 ARRIVAL AT PLAYA LARGA Playa Larga, or Big Beach, was one of the landing sites of the Brigade 2506 0:18:30 BEGIN PRESS BRIEFING AT PLAYA LARGA CONDUCTED BY CUBAN VP, JOSE RAMON FERNANDEZ Speaking in front of a projection screen of various slides and provides comments: 0:19 -- The command structure of the Kennedy Administration. 0:21 -- Map of the Caribbean showing points of departure for the various invading forces, the direction of approach to the island of Cuba, and the landing sites.
0:22 --Various maps of the Bay of Pigs region, and detailed maps of landing points. 0:28 Without maps, lists the various Brigade 2506 training camps within the US, and the training procedures. Discusses the Cuban Revolution’s ideological basis for resisting US imperialism. Kennedy’s claim of responsibility for the attack and addresses whether this has had an effect on US/Cuban relations. 0:34 Asks for questions. No questions. Adjourns the conference to continue on to Playa Giron and the Final Press Conference. (Here there is a Time Code break in tape, but resumes after a few seconds.) 0:36 BEGIN FINAL PRESS BRIEFING AT PLAYA GIRON Playa Giron, or Giron Beach, was the site of the final battle of the Bay of Pigs. This final press conference was conducted by VP RAMON FERNANDEZ. After his initial comments, questions were taken from the conference participants and the press. CUBAN VP, JOSE RAMON FERNANDEZ Continues with presentation begun at Playa Larga, i.e. to complete presentation of the events of the Bay of Pigs attack… 0:37 -- Map of the Bay of Pigs. Details the US air attacks, the US naval operations and the Cuban military responses.
0:45 Points to place where the war was actually won.
0:46 The US ships came in to rescue the Brigade. Were not successful. Prisoners taken. Consolidation of the Cuban Revolution.
0:48 He ends his statement with thanks to all participants, no matter who they are or what their roles were during the attack at the Bay of Pigs. (Here there is a Time Code break in tape, but resumes after a few seconds.) 0:50 BEGIN PRESS CONFERENCE AT PLAYA GIRON The Panel included Peter Kornbluh, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr, Alfredo Duran, Riccardo Alarcon and VP Jose Ramon Fernandez. (This sections does not always have English translation.) Statement in Spanish by Cuban official. 0:51:30 Another statement in Spanish by second Cuban official. 0:55 PETER KORNBLUH – National Security Archives Concluding remarks from the National Security Archive as to the historical significance of the conference. 1:00 AUTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR. – Special Asst. to President Kennedy His own concluding remarks on the essential need to understand the historical facts and to learn from them. 1:08 ALFREDO DURAN – Cuban-American – 2506 Brigade Veteran Speaks to the truth of ending this conference at Playa Giron. Extends tribute to all the Cubans who died at the Bay of Pigs. 1:10 Cuban official asks for questions 1:10 QUESTION (in Spanish) as to how the US policy might change. 1:11 AUTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR. – Special Asst. to President Kennedy Responds with a short survey of US presidential and congressional politics. 1:17 QUESTION (in Spanish) as to whether the Bay of Pigs meant a no-way-back turning point for the CUBA/USSR alliance and, hence Cuba’s turning away from the US. 1:19 RICARDO ALARCON – Cuban – Head of Consejo de Estado Responds. 1:24 QUESTION (in Spanish) To SCHLESINGER as to what are the real steps needed to affect the lifting the Blockade. 1:25:30 AUTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR. – Special Asst. to President Kennedy Responds with the historical background for the Embargo; his predictions for the future. 1:30:30 RICARDO ALARCON – Cuban – Head of Consejo de Estado Makes final statement as to the many attempts of the US to either incorporate Cuba into the United States or to impinge its sovereignty. 1:49 AUTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR. – Special Asst. to President Kennedy Responds to ALARCON. 1:51 CUBAN VP, JOSE RAMON FERNANDEZ Officially closes the conference and reminds all participants of the evening reception to be hosted by FIDEL CASTRO in Havana. 1:52 END TAPE TEN – THE LAST TAPE OF THE 3-DAY CONFERENCE "THE BAY OF PIGS: 40 YEARS LATER"
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